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The Japanese economy has had four recessions since 1990. Also the U.S. economy has been 
in difficulties during more recent years but there are clear signs of an economic recovery. 
While Japan’s difficulties are not the mirror image of those in the United States, it is 
interesting to note that the same mix of policy responses might support recovery in Japan: 
aggressive monetary action to address deflationary pressures, fiscal policy oriented around 
controlling spending and long-run tax forms that also provide near-term stimulus, and 
structural reforms to improve capital market functioning. This policy mix to help revive the 
Japanese economy will involve politically difficult decisions. In this context, the role of the 
United States should be to acknowledge the steps that have already been taken in Japan and 
call attention to those steps that remain to be carried out. 
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  On the virtual anniversary of the tragic terrorist attacks on the United States, I 
appreciate this opportunity to address this distinguished group.  I am even more gratified that 
Prime Minister Koizumi has honored the United States with a visit at this time.  It is 
indicative of the deep mutual friendship between our nations, and of the great support Japan 
has shown the United States, especially during this past year. 
 
  Anniversaries are a time for acknowledgement and also for reflection.  About a year 
ago, I came to discuss the prospects for reform and growth in Japan.  The Japanese economy 
that had outperformed most industrialized economies over much of the past half century was 
experiencing its fourth recession since 1990.  Japanese asset markets reflected this difficulty, 
with a decline in the Nikkei index of almost 30 percent since January 2001—and this was 
from a Nikkei already over 30 percent below its peak reached in March 2000.  The United 
States was in the midst of a difficult period as well.  The U.S. economy was struggling to 
recover from a recession that we now know was more severe and sustained than was 
expected or appreciated at that time.  This recovery was set back by the attacks of September 
11, which had significant economic, as well as human, consequences. 
 
  Even at that time, however, there were reasons for optimism in both countries.  In 
Japan, plans were being made for tax reforms aimed at promoting investment, a strengthened 
commitment was made to address the non-performing loan (NPL) problem, and strategies 
were being developed to enhance competitiveness.  These efforts promised to serve as a 
foundation for more extensive reform and policy initiatives to restore Japanese economic 
vitality and enhance economic growth.  In the United States, meanwhile, reductions in 
marginal tax rates proposed by the President and legislated by Congress in May 2001 as a 
sound long-term tax policy demonstrated an added benefit of bolstering consumer spending 
and thus helping the economy to emerge from recession. 
 
  A year later, the U.S. economy’s recovery is underway.  Real GDP grew at an annual 
rate of 3.1 percent in the first half of 2002, and private sector forecasters anticipate the 
growth rate of GDP at just slightly below this rate in the second half of the year. The 
Japanese economy, too, has shown some signs of improvement.  However, concerns remain.  
Some fear that U.S. stock market losses earlier this year and high-profile corporate scandals 
have caused investors to be more cautious, hurting global capital markets.  Indeed, some   3 
commentators have argued that the combination of accounting scandals and equity price 
declines make the U.S. model of market-centered financial capitalism a less persuasive model 
for the rest of the world.  Others have argued that government budget deterioration in the 
United States poses risks for the U.S. recovery and the global economy.   
 
  I do not share these views.  Actions by markets, regulators, and policymakers for the 
United States have already improved confidence in financial markets, the recovery, and the 
allocation of capital.  Likewise, President Bush remains committed to spending restraint.   In 
my remarks, I offer our experience over the past year as an example of how policies can 
improve the economy, and provide some observations on the restructuring and reform agenda 
in Japan.   
 
The United States 
  It is useful to begin with the broad setting for the United States economic outlook and 
policies.  Over the long term, productivity growth is the most important determinant of 
growth and living standards.  The structure of an economy, including the institutional and 
legal framework that support markets, is the key influence on productivity and thus on the 
sustainable rate of economic growth.  Historically, the U.S. model is an undeniable success in 
this respect. 
 
  The deregulation of the U.S. economy beginning in the 1970s and 1980s was and is a 
tremendous source of economic flexibility and success in generating resources for our 
economy.  Deregulation, along with reductions in marginal tax rates and victory in the Cold 
War, fueled a long boom in the United States that was interrupted only briefly during the 
early 1990s.  In particular, the post-1995 boom in productivity growth in the United States 
stands out from other industrial economies.   Many have attributed this productivity 
acceleration to the development of new technologies.  While this attribution carries a grain of 
truth, businesses around the world can all buy the same technology, so the roots of the U.S. 
advantage lie elsewhere.  The U. S. model – a flexible, market system – provides rewards to 
entrepreneurial, private-sector investment that deploy these technologies in productive risk-
taking.  The preservation and support of these incentives is central to long-term productivity 
growth. 
 
  The recent behavior of inflation also bodes well for the long term.  Inflation remains 
low and stable in the United States, with minimal impact on economic decisions such as the   4 
ability of businesses to plan for the future.  The absence of inflation pressures also means that 
the Federal Reserve would have policy room in which to maneuver in the near term. 
 
  Turning to the near-term outlook, the Administration’s economic outlook is contained 
in detail in the Mid-Session Review of the Budget, which I will summarize only briefly.  Year-
over-year GDP growth in 2002 was projected to be 2.6 percent, compared with 0.7 percent in 
the last Budget.  Growth during 2002-12 is projected to average 3.2 percent per year.  Since 
the preparation of the Mid-Session Review, new information about economic activity and 
declines in equity values have raised questions about the economic recovery.  As the 
Administration does not prepare another official forecast until the next Budget early next 
year, I would like to walk through the expected mechanics of the current recovery and how 
recent data affect economists’ forecasts of the recovery. 
 
  After three consecutive quarters of negative growth in 2001, the U.S. economy has 
experienced three consecutive quarters of positive GDP growth, peaking at 5.0 percent in the 
first quarter of 2002.  While growth did slow to 1.1 percent in the second quarter, the rate is 
consistent with the now-familiar mechanics of the present economic recovery.     The starting 
point for upward momentum is the legacy of aggressive monetary easing by the Federal 
Reserve during 2001.  Over the course of that year, the Fed cut its target federal funds rate 
eleven times, lowering the target from 6.5 percent to 1.75 percent, with the most recent 
reductions occurring in December 2001.  Given the well-known lags in monetary policy, 
these reductions will continue to provide stimulus throughout the remainder of 2002 and 
beyond. 
 
Among components of final demand, solid consumption growth continues to provide 
the foundation of continued strength in the growth.  Indeed, as is well known, the household 
sector has been a source of strength in final demand over the course of the recession and 
recovery.  In addition to enhancing long-term economic efficiency, the tax cut proposed by 
the President and passed by Congress last spring provided valuable support for disposable 
incomes.  Substantial cuts in the target federal funds rate by the Federal Reserve have 
translated into lower mortgage interest rates, supporting housing starts and mortgage 
refinancing.  The upshot has been solid growth in personal consumption expenditures and 
residential investment that are supporting the recovery. 
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In addition, growth in GDP has benefited from government purchases associated with 
enhanced homeland security and short-run inventory dynamics; the latter are estimated to 
have contributed 2.6 percentage points to GDP growth during the first quarter, and 1.4 
percentage points in the second quarter.  These factors are likely to continue to contribute a 
bit in the near term, while there is little basis for expectation of dramatic aggregate demand 
growth stemming from the international sector.   
 
Inventory investment contributed to the economic slowdown, but by early in 2002, the 
pace of inventory decline slowed, providing a significant boost to production.  In some 
sectors of the economy, evidence suggests that inventory restocking is underway.  Over the 
next several quarters, as inventory and sales growth come together, inventory investment’s 
role in real GDP growth should provide momentum.   
 
However, the key to transforming recovery into robust growth is the pace of business 
fixed investment.  Only with robust business investment will labor markets firm and the 
economy return to robust job creation.  The recently passed “Job Creation and Worker 
Assistance Act of 2002” contains provisions to reduce disincentives to investment  – 
specifically, 30 percent expensing.  Businesses are permitted to deduct immediately 30 
percent of the cost of new qualifying business investments undertaken in the three years 
starting on September 11, 2001.  Moving toward faster capital-cost recovery – in the extreme, 
full expensing of investment outlays – represents an important step toward fundamental 
reform of the United States tax code.    
 
In addition to being sound long-term tax policy, these provisions provide valuable 
support for an investment recovery.  Moreover, the interest rate environment remains 
favorable and the corporate profitability appears to be improving.   As reported in the 
National Income and Product Accounts, profits from domestic operations have increased 14.1 
percent (not annualized) during the past three quarters.  The gain in profits is partly accounted 
for by very modest growth of unit labor costs.  Productivity grew 4.9 percent during the past 
four quarters (a period that includes recession and recovery) – and quite rapidly during the 
first quarter.  The Employment Cost Index measure of hourly compensation growth was 
stable at about four percent, allowing profit margins to expand.  Given the stronger 
fundamentals, investment should recover, something that has been hinted at by recent 
evidence on orders for durable goods and surveys of purchasing managers’ intentions. 
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  For the economy as a whole, business investment slowed its decline during the first 
quarter.  Investment in nonresidential structures continues to decline, but purchases of 
equipment and software have shown some signs of firming.  The most recent data are 
consistent with flat to modest growth in investment during the second quarter thus far.  For 
example, the Commerce Department announced that new orders for manufactured durable 
goods excluding semiconductors increased 9.2 percent in July, after falling 4.5 percent in 
June.  New orders for nondefense capital goods (which give an indication of future 
investment spending) rose 14.3 percent in July, compared to a 9.6 percent decrease in June.  
Shipments of nondefense capital goods (which give an indication of current business 
investment) increased 3.7 percent in July after declining 2.2 percent in June. 
 
On balance, then, while forecasts are promising, we await firm evidence of a rebound 
in business investment strong enough to sustain rapid rates of job growth.   Such evidence is 
likely in the coming months, as firms respond to improved sales and profits, investment tax 
incentives, and enhancements in productivity made possible by advances in technology.  The 
recent data on industrial production suggest continued growth.  
 
Of course, there are risks to this outlook.  For example, the decline in equity prices 
since the end of May – reflecting shifts in the equity risk premium and concerns over, among 
other things, profitability and the quality of financial data – represents a clear loss of 
household wealth through direct holdings and 401(k) and retirement plans.  Indeed, the 
current business cycle is somewhat unique in this regard.  During a typical cycle, household 
balance sheets are relatively stable, while flows of personal income suffer and subsequently 
recover.  In contrast, during the current episode personal income – especially disposable 
personal income, supported by the tax cut – has held up quite well, while household balance 
sheets have suffered.   
 
Weakness in household balance sheets has raised concerns over the durability of the 
recovery.  As is well known, consumption tends to lose three to five cents for every dollar of 
lost wealth.  In addition, investment also falls because of the higher cost of capital.  
Combining these effects, a permanent loss of, for example, 20 percent in stock-market value 
– together with other macroeconomic interactions in a standard model, including any 
offsetting action by the Federal Reserve – would reduce the level of real GDP by roughly 0.6 
to 1.0 percentage point after one year. While this is a significant impact, it would not   7 
overwhelm the upward path of the recovery.  Moreover, the reduction in GDP would be a 
transitory event, with GDP returning to its former path after three years or so.  
 
  Among the possible factors underlying the recent move in equity markets are a global 
rise in the equity risk premium and U.S.-specific concerns over the quality of reported 
corporate earnings.  In this regard, the United States took quick steps to ensure that financial 
reporting met sufficient standards of transparency and accountability.  The President outlined 
a ten-point plan to improve corporate responsibility and provide incentives for prompt, clear 
disclosure of relevant economic information.  Congress recently complemented this effort 
with the Sarbanes-Oxley bill, which the President supported and signed into law on July 30. 
 
  It is important to recognize the link between economic diagnosis and policy response.  
A central lesson of the long boom in the United States has been the reliance on private 
markets to allocate capital. By improving the information available in capital markets, 
investors will be better able to pursue their desired combinations of risk and return, and 
equity market valuations will reflect investment opportunities better. 
 
  The quick and decisive action to improve market functioning stands in contrast to the 
experience during the savings and loan (S&L) and banking crisis in the late 1980s. The early 
handling of this crisis by regulators was a costly mistake.  Regulatory forbearance and the 
lack of prompt corrective action made a large problem much worse, even in the absence of 
legal and regulatory impediments to restructuring. 
 
  Another potential risk is increases in crude oil prices. Oil prices have risen roughly 
$10 per barrel recently.  The spot price of low-sulfur West Texas Intermediate crude has risen 
above $30 per barrel for the first time since February 2001, while the OPEC basket price 
index (which includes both high- and low-sulfur crude oils) has remained within OPEC’s 
target band of $22-$28.  A sustained increase in oil prices of $10 per barrel would be 
expected to lower GDP by about 0.25 to 0.50 percent after six months to one year.  Larger 
increases pose a more substantial risk. 
 
Some commentators focus on the return of U.S. federal budget deficits as a risk to 
economic recovery; indeed, in the minds of some, proposals to raise taxes become necessary.  
Despite essentially no empirical evidence that moderate changes in budget surpluses are 
related to long-term interest rates, proponents of this view argue that increasing the budget   8 
surplus is the key to faster growth.  In reality, these concepts are linked.  However, the causal 
links are reversed – a stronger economy produces higher revenue and larger surpluses.   
 
At present, the budget is on track to return to unified surplus in the 2005 fiscal year, 
with the near-term shortfalls reflecting primarily the combined influences of recession, the 
need to prosecute the war on terrorism, and the demands of homeland security.  In this 
setting, the greatest economic risk associated with the budget is failing to prioritize national 
needs and control the growth of spending.  Spending discipline limits the need for growth-
reducing taxes in the present and future.  Pro-growth tax policies that lower marginal tax rates 
and reduce the tax on productive risk-taking are good long-run policies to build budgetary 
resources over the long-term.  Economic growth is a direct consequence of millions of 
individual decisions to produce, save, and invest.  Any added tax burden today would be a 
step in the wrong direction. 
 
  Of course, there are upside wild cards as well.  An important recent development for 
the long-run growth outlook was the passage of Trade Promotional Authority (TPA) 
legislation.  Having signed TPA into law, the President has the authority to pursue an 
ambitious agenda of agreements to enhance global free trade, with benefits in the United 
States and the world economy. 
 
  To summarize, the U.S. economy has faced serious challenges during the past year.  
The policy response has been an aggressive monetary easing paired with advances in fiscal 
policy and structural reform.  In the former, U. S. tax policy has focused on long-run 
fundamentals – lower marginal tax rates, faster capital cost recovery as incentives for 
investment, and recognition of the need for spending restraint.  Structural reforms have 
focused on the role of increased transparency and accountability in financial reporting in 
providing improved performance of capital markets. 
 
Japan 
  The postwar revitalization of the Japanese economy is one of the outstanding episodes 
in modern economic growth.  Unfortunately, over the past decade, Japan’s economic 
performance has been disappointing and represents lost opportunities to improve living 
standards.  Better economic performance would also enhance Japan’s important role in the 
world and provide an additional strong engine of growth for the global economy. 
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  While Japan’s difficulties are not the mirror image of those in the United States, it is 
interesting to note that the same mix of policy responses might support recovery in Japan: 
aggressive monetary action to address deflationary pressures, fiscal policy oriented around 
controlling spending and long-run tax forms that also provide near-term stimulus, and 
structural reforms to improve capital market functioning.    This policy mix to help revive the 
Japanese economy will involve politically difficult decisions.  In this context, the role of the 
United States should be to acknowledge the steps that have already been taken in Japan and 
call attention to those steps that remain to be carried out. 
 
  I believe that recent U.S. experience is relevant to these economic policy challenges 
in Japan.   Consider the parallel – albeit not direct comparison – between the U.S. corporate 
accounting challenge and Japan’s non-performing asset problem.  While the U.S. focus is on 
the quality of financial information regarding real performance, and Japanese concerns center 
on  both financial information and returns to real assets, they share the common feature of 
highlighting the importance of using markets to allocate (and reallocate) capital efficiently.  
Learning from the challenges to restructuring is something best done in a dialogue between 
friends rather than in isolation.  That is one reason I am particularly interested in the 
prospects for the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) conference on “corporate 
restructuring” this summer. 
 
  The dedication to economic fundamentals in Prime Minister Koizumi’s vision has 
great potential for reward.   If the necessary reforms are implemented in Japan, productivity 
growth will increase, and will be reflected in asset markets as well.  Likewise, as we also 
know from the experience of the United States and other economies, without reform, market-
driven benefits to the Japanese economy will not materialize. 
 
   The crux of the problem facing the Japanese economy and its corporate sector may 
be summarized by examining a few pieces of data.  The simplest starting point is to examine 
Japan’s productivity, which, after averaging 2.9 percent in the 1980s, fell to 0.7 percent for 
the 1990-95 period, and has been averaging 1.3 percent since.  Obviously, the impact of this 
decline is felt in the corporate sector.  The nonfinancial corporate sector’s return on assets, 
calculated using the latest Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations from the Ministry 
of Finance, stood at 2.5 percent in the second quarter.  This is above the recent trough of 1.8 
percent in 1998, but well below the historical Japanese average of 4 percent.   
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   These same data reveal that there is a clear difference between large manufacturers 
and the remainder of manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms.  The large manufacturing 
firms in Japan are world-class competitors who have, and are continuing to, transform 
themselves in seeking to hold their competitive positions.  Not surprisingly, these large 
manufacturers can and have moved away from bank financing to direct financing.  For these 
firms, the share of bank debt in total liabilities has fallen from 37.4 percent in the fourth 
quarter of 1986 to current levels of 26.5 percent.  Instead, the NPLs are concentrated in those 
firms that are not, and without restructuring cannot, go directly to capital markets.  In 
particular, domestically oriented firms in construction, real estate, and wholesale and retail 
trade are increasingly accounting for a greater share of NPLs, which had already accounted 
for 57 percent of the NPLs by September 2001.   
 
  In contrast to the pressure to restructure from international competition, the 
undercapitalized banks that have made these loans have a weaker incentive to participate in 
the restructuring of a borrower, preferring to defer realization of losses by continuing to roll 
over loans to borrowers.  A poorly capitalized bank has only a weak interest in resolving its 
problem loans, because full information about the extent of the trouble could result in the 
realization of insolvency and loss of bank equity.  To avoid regulatory scrutiny, poorly 
capitalized banks can struggle to keep loans current, papering over the problem in the 
misplaced hope for a reversal of fortune.  In short, banks can often face the wrong incentives 
for handling the problem. 
 
  For this reason, there is a role for policy to improve the working of capital markets in 
this setting.  The Financial Services Agency (FSA) has targeted the NPLs of the major banks 
in its reform proposals, a helpful first step.  In addition, the Japanese Bankers Association and 
the Keidanren have proposed a new framework for out-of-court workouts, based on the 
principles of the International Federation of Insolvency Professionals (INSOL).  However, it 
is important that banks use the new legal and regulatory framework to confront problem 
loans.  
 
  The special inspections conducted by the FSA from October to March were an initial 
step in using a regulatory lever to force action. Most important, the inspections were market-
based, and forward looking involving 149 large corporate bank loan customers who had 
experienced significant changes in stock prices and/or external credit ratings.  Most of these 
borrowers came from the weak construction, real estate, and wholesale and retail trade   11 
sectors.  Of the loans examined, almost 60 percent were downgraded, with roughly 30 
percent newly classified as “in danger of bankruptcy or below.” The FSA has called for banks 
to dispose of newly emerging NPLs over a three-year time period, and now has called on 
banks to dispose of one-half of these loans in the first year and 80 percent after two years.  
The FSA is also calling for permanent, on-site inspectors at the major banks.  I hope that 
these inspections and permanent inspectors signal the end of regulatory forbearance and the 
beginning of a hard-nosed, realistic evaluation of bank assets. 
 
  Problem loans are best identified on the basis of future cash flows and realistic 
assessments of the value of collateral and guarantees.  The resolution of problem loans will 
lead to better economic performance if not limited to debt forgiveness, but rather focused on 
restructuring the operations of firms.  Naturally, such an exercise involves recognizing losses 
by both the banks and the companies, but this is key to moving capital to its most efficient 
uses.     Alternatively, some have argued that bank mergers might serve as a mechanism for 
triggering a restructuring of NPLs.  Unfortunately, based on U.S. experience, bank mergers 
alone are unlikely to bring about the necessary downsizing of balance sheets.  Closing 
insolvent institutions should remain a viable option.  
 
  Deposit insurance reform with limits on coverage is an important factor in assuring 
market discipline on banks.  Recent discussions on postponing or modifying the scheduled 
Japanese deposit insurance reform demonstrate that there is still much concern about the 
readiness of the Japanese banking system to take  this step.  But I encourage you to take the 
steps that would reform and strengthen the banking sector so that limited despositor 
guarantees can be introduced without disruption. 
 
    By contrast, continuation of the full guarantee will not give banks the correct 
incentives when making loan decisions.  If a bank is nearing insolvency, it has the incentive 
to play a dangerous game when deciding to offer a risky loan—heads, the bank wins and 
tails, the tax-payer loses, as the government is ultimately responsible for the bad loan.  
Delaying the elimination of the cap on deposit insurance simply allows more time for 
insolvent institutions to take risks and experience losses, thereby ultimately increasing the 
costs of resolving the problems in the financial system.  
 
  These policies focus on the role of banks in providing incentives to improve the 
allocation of capital in the economy.  However, other steps can complement this effort.    12 
Planned legislation for a further revision of the Commercial Code would modernize corporate 
governance.  Access to stock swaps by foreign firms would facilitate restructuring by making 
it unnecessary to set up domestic subsidiaries to participate in mergers and acquisitions.  The 
fiduciary responsibility of money managers toward shareholders could be further clarified.  
The U.S. experience suggests that a statute like that contained in the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (ERISA) and the associated “Avon Letter” from the Department of 
Labor can help clarify what is expected of pension fund money managers.  Procedures for 
foreclosing on collateral should be simplified.  Finally, portable pensions will help boost 
labor market flexibility.  These additional measures will certainly enhance the restructuring 
environment. 
 
  Halting deflation is another important element in reviving growth in the Japanese 
economy.  While each of us as an individual may benefit from falling goods prices as long as 
our income does not change, deflation wreaks havoc with business balance sheets, reducing 
production, incomes, and employment.  In Japan, deflationary pressures exacerbate structural 
difficulties in reallocating capital, aggravating the non-performing loan problem by 
increasing the ranks of non-performing assets warehoused in the banking system. Japan has 
experienced deflation for three consecutive years and deflation now appears to be entrenched 
in expectations. 
 
  During the past year, the Bank of Japan had undertaken steps to increase current 
account balances (“reserves”), but expansionary policy appears to be losing its momentum.  
The signs of this easing of monetary policy had been apparent, with the monetary base up 
36.3 percent year-over-year.  Yet, after peaking in April, monetary base growth has 
decelerated to 26.1 percent.  Moreover, growth in M2 plus CDs have also been disappointing 
--- up only 3.5 percent year-over-year in August.  Experience in other countries suggests that 
large and sustained increases in the money supply are necessary to overcome deflation. The 
Bank of Japan can and should pursue bolder monetary easing to end deflation. This would be 
consistent with the Bank’s own framework, announced in March 2001, to target the quantity 
of money and achieve price stability.  But we should also recognize that monetary policy 
cannot solve all of Japan’s problems alone.  It will work best as a part of a comprehensive 
program aimed at revitalizing the Japanese economy. 
 
  Japan also faces the critical medium-term challenge of consolidating its fiscal 
balances.  Within the context of a credible and transparent medium-term consolidation plan,   13 
tax reforms in Japan-coupled, for example, with a spending constraint—can help increase the 
incentives for growth. As discussed earlier, the pro-growth tax policy of 2001 both helped to 
speed the U.S. economic recovery and will improve incentives for productive risk-taking, 
saving, investment, and long-run growth.  Reports that Japanese tax reform plans focus on the 
need to address distortions in the tax system, broaden tax bases, and lower marginal tax rates 
are a promising development for Japan and the global economy.    
 
  It is essential that Japan’s economy return to healthy rates of growth in order to meet 
the needs of an aging population.  In this sense it is important to think of tax reform as a 
sensible “long-run” policy.  Tax policy can, though, also support the necessary quick action 
on banking and corporate restructuring that is needed to restart growth.  Prudent tax changes 
can lead to better functioning capital markets and make important contributions to the process 
of structural adjustment.  (Such contributions exceed those of spending changes: Kenneth 
Kuttner and Adam Posen estimate that, for Japan, the economic multiplier on tax changes is 
significantly larger than the economic multiplier on expenditure changes.)  Transactions taxes 
and taxes on dividends and capital gains are capitalized in asset values.  A move to a broader 
tax base with lower rates on capital income and transactions would raise asset prices and 
thereby facilitate structural adjustment.  
 
Income taxes present significant opportunities to reduce tax rates and broaden the tax 
base.  The Japanese tax code identifies ten different types of income, for example, each taxed 
at a different rate.  In particular, interest income, capital gains, and dividends are all taxed at 
separate rates.  The net effect of this disparity gives debt financing an advantage.  In addition, 
longer-term capital gains on property are taxed at one-half the rate of short-term capital gains, 
providing an incentive to delay transactions.  This asymmetry hinders the promotion of deep 
and well-functioning asset markets, markets that will be key in Japan’s restructuring process.  
Equalizing the effective tax rate on all returns to equity is good tax policy.  Lowering the 
effective rate will aid asset market performance. 
 
Tax reform  discussions have also touched on the inheritance and gift tax as well as 
the land registration tax.  An important element for Japan’s revitalization is that the real estate 
market – a particularly important asset market – operate with as few distortions as possible.  
That is, the transfer of the collateral behind problem loans must be as quick, transparent, and 
seamless as possible.  In this environment, a registration tax as high as five percent on real 
estate transactions reduces real estate values and inhibits restructuring.     14 
 
Looking over a long horizon, broadening the income tax base and lowering income 
tax rates will help to stabilize tax revenues as the needs of an aging population begin to 
mount. Although statutory marginal income tax rates are close to those in the United States, 
the many allowances have made for a relatively narrow base -- 15 to 20 percent of all 
employment income tax earners pay no tax.  A calculation by the OECD indicates that the 
combined exemptions and allowances at the local and national level have reduced income tax 
collections by ten percent of GDP (without taking into account behavioral effects of tax 
policy). 
 
Strengthening the tax system is good economic policy, especially for Japan in the 
current environment.  A more unified treatment of income, both for households and 
businesses, and treating land like any other asset to reduce the tax drag on asset values and 
transactions will help to solidify and advance the other planks of the Prime Minister’s reform 
and recovery agenda. 
 
With all of these planks in place, the outlook for Japan will improve.  The lessons are 
clear, both from a historical perspective and from current events: Markets have and will 




  In previous visits to Tokyo over the past year, I have been optimistic about Japan’s 
ability to cure the woes of recession, deflation, and nonperforming loans through a strong 
reform agenda.  I remain optimistic that the Koizumi administration can meet its pledge to 
move forward with policy reform.  And I believe the role that U.S. corporate reform and pro-
growth tax policy has played in aiding our financial markets and recovery can provide useful 
input to the policy debate in Japan.   